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PRETRIAL REMEDIES IN INFRINGEMENT
ACTIONS: THE COPYRIGHT HOLDER'S
IMPOUND OF FLESH?
INTRODUCTION
The protection of intellectual property and the various
tangible forms it takes is regulated by a copyright law' whichhas rather miraculously2 withstood nearly 70 years of attack,
unforeseen technology,3 and judicial tinkering.
In 1976 Congress enacted a general revision of the Copy-
right Act,4 an effort perhaps inherently doomed to continual
criticism since the notion of exclusivity in one's intellectual
creations is the product of a marriage of two concepts funda-
mentally at odds with one another: monopoly and freedom of
expression.5 This conflict manifests itself as a battle between
the copyright holder, who is interested in preserving his mo-
1. 17 U.S.C. §§ 1-216 (1970) (effective through Dec. 31, 1977) (amended 1976).
2. The "miracle" has been the flexibility of the Copyright Office and the courts
in dealing with "what can only be termed anachronistic legislation." Duchess Music
Corp. v. Stern, 331 F. Supp. 127, 128 (D. Ariz. 1971), rev'd, 458 F.2d 1305 (9th Cir.),
cert. denied, 409 U.S. 847 (1972).
3. The recently revised copyright law is admirable for its handling of the newforms of expression which have been developed in this century. See Revision of Copy-
right Law, Pub. L. No. 94-553, § 106(4),(5), 90 Stat. 2541 (1976)(effective Jan. 1, 1978)(to be codified in 17 U.S.C.) (motion pictures); id. §§ 106(3), 114, 115 (phonograph
records); id. §§ 107, 108 (photocopying); id. §§ 110(5), 118 (television); id. § 111 (cable
television); id. § 116 (coinoperated phonorecord players); id. § 117 (computers).
4. See Revision of Copyright Law, Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2541 (1972).
Congress is empowered by the Constitution "to promote the Progress of Science
and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive
Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8. In accord
with this mandate the Congress in 1955 undertook a reform of the 1909 copyright law,
and appropriated funds for studies by the Copyright Office. The first report, an excel-lent source of background material on the revisions, was issued in 1961. See COPYRIGHT
LAW REVISION: REPORT OF THE REGISTER OF COPYRIGHTS ON THE GENERAL REVISION OF THE
U.S. COPYRIGHT LAW (1961) [hereinafter cited as 1961 REPORT].
The 1955 legislative appropriation was the fourth reform undertaken since the first
copyright law was enacted in 1790. Revisions were passed in 1831, and 1909. The last
revision remains in effect until December 31, 1977. Id. at ix-x.
The long hiatus between the 1909 Act and the 1955 appropriation can be explainedby two major events. First, during the 1930's worldwide emphasis was placed on pas-
sage of an international copyright act, resulting in the Berne Convention of 1931. There
were fundamental differences between the Convention and the 1909 Act which were
never resolved by Congress, and eventually the idea of United States membership inthe Convention was abandoned. Second, World War II intervened, ending reform
movements until the 1950's, when the United States joined the Universal CopyrightConvention. Id. See generally E.P. SKONE JAMES, COPINGER AND SKONE JAMES ON
COPYRIGHT (11th ed. 1972).
5. See Nimmer, Does Copyright Abridge the First Amendment Guarantee ofFree Speech and Press?, 17 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 1180 (1970) [hereinafter cited as Nim-
mer].
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nopoly, and the "infringer," who, wishing to use the copyright
holder's creation, claims that to deny it to him would be an
abrogation of his freedom of expression.
Initially, this comment focuses on the infringement action
and the methods of pretrial relief available to the copyright
holder to safeguard his copyright from infringement. In partic-
ular, the discussion centers on section 503 of the revised Act,'
under which the copyright holder is entitled to a pretrial, ex
parte hearing,7 followed by an impoundment procedure which
requires him to post a bond of at least twice the value of the
impounded articles.'
Following this examination of the methods of pretrial re-
lief, the comment explores the constitutional deficiencies of the
impoundment procedure as tested by the constitutional prohi-
bition against taking property without due process of law and
the first amendment? Finally, this comment develops a bal-
ancing approach to harmonize the copyright holder's concerns
and the infringer's challenge and demonstrates how the appli-
cation of this balancing approach would resolve the tension
between pre-trial and constitutional safeguards.10
PRETRIAL RELIEF
The argument for preliminary relief takes shape from a
clear need for some sort of immediate relief when a copyright
infringement is alleged, since failure to act quickly can result
in the financial ruin of the innocent party. In many cases, for
example, where an allegedly infringing phonograph record is
about to be released or a motion picture exhibited, the copy-
right holder may have only hours in which to act.
Since courts do not, in the normal course of judicial busi-
ness, act with such speed, extraordinary remedies have been
developed which may be implemented quickly and with little
preparation or notice. Those seeking such a speedy remedy in
an infringement case can resort either to the Copyright Act
6. See Revision of Copyright Law, Pub. L. No. 94-553, § 503, 90 Stat. 2541 (1976).
7. Id. § 503(a).
8. See note 51 infra.
9. See notes 97-141 and accompanying text infra.
10. The conflict exists because the Constitution mandates the existence of a
copyright law and also sets forth the freedoms of the first and fifth amendments. For
a discussion of the notion that the amendments supercede the body of the Constitu-
tion, i.e. that they were intended literally to amend it, see Nimmer, supra note 5, at
1182.
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itself and the impound provisions of section 101(c)," or turn to
the more traditional remedies of the temporary restraining
order and preliminary injunction."2
Both the preliminary injunction and impound attempt to
balance the need for immediate action to protect the copyright
holder against the inappropriateness of imposing a remedy that
drastically affects the alleged infringer before a hearing on the
merits. They strike different balances and each generates its
own set of practical problems.
Preliminary Injunction-The Traditional Equity Rule in Copy-
right Practice
The Copyright Act specifically allows for preliminary in-junctions and the procedure has evolved into a highly flexible
and variable remedy which presents special problems when it
is examined for consistency and speed of application."3 Further-
more, the fact that a preliminary injunction entitles the defen-
dant to retain possession of the allegedly infringing articles
raises the question of whether or not the remedy is adequate
in the special circumstances of infringement actions.
Commonly used in all types of civil actions, 4 the prelimi-
nary injunction procedure provides for an adversary hearing
before any court action, and gives protection to defendants
from unfair deprivation of their property, since the defendant
11. 17 U.S.C. § 101(c) (1970).
12. FED. R. Civ. P. 65(a), (b).
To comport with the focus of the comment, the temporary restraining order will
be considered synonymous with the preliminary injunction. Though the procedures for
each differ, when contrasted with impoundment they are both inherently more protec-
tive of the alleged infringer. Additionally, in the infringement setting, they are really
just two steps in one overall process. See note 18 infra.
13. The 1909 Act provides for injunctive relief at § 112. More protective of defen-
dants than the impound provision, it called for the granting of injunctions "according
to the course and principles of courts of equity." This meant that the plaintiff had to
make the showing traditionally required for injunctive relief, and it also meant that
such showing would be made after notice of the hearing was served upon the defendant.
Section 502 of the revised act also provides for the granting of preliminary injunc-
tions. At the revision sessions the only controversy about proposed changes in the
injunction procedure arose over the possibility of writing an allowance for court discre-
tion into the law. Those who opposed the allowance favored the free granting of prelim-
inary injunctions. This controversy had no real foundation however, as the 1961 Regis-
ter's Report pointed out, since the granting of injunctions has always been discretion-
ary. The new § 502(a) does not mention discretion and retains the language of § 112
that injunctions will be granted "on such terms as [the court] may deem reasonable."
14. See, e.g., FED. R. Civ. P. 65; CAL. CIw. PROC. CODE § 527 (West 1970); N.Y.
CIv. PRAC. LAW § 6301 (McKinney 1966).
SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW
has an opportunity to be heard before action is taken. To ob-
tain a preliminary injunction a showing of infringement must
be made, and some difficulties exist with this requirement. The
courts have demonstrated a remarkable inconsistency in the
showing needed, ranging from mere allegations of infringement
to a practical adjudication of the merits of the case at the
hearing."
Originally developed as an equitable remedy, the prelimi-
nary injunction was codified in 1948 by rule 65 of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure. Rule 65 was intended to insure proce-
dural consistency and requires that notice be given to the ad-
verse party before an injunction will issue. Thus, a plaintiff
seeking a preliminary injunction has a double burden: he must
meet the notice requirements of rule 6516 and make the showing
traditionally required for equitable relief.'" As noted above, the
showing required has been highly variable, with the result that
the preliminary injunction procedure, as currently applied,
may make it unduly difficult for plaintiffs to obtain appropri-
ate pre-trial protection from infringement.'" The general uncer-
tainty that results is troublesome, as an examination of prelim-
inary injunction cases in the copyright field illustrates.
Traditional equity concepts indicate two major situations
where injunctive relief will be granted: a prima facie showing
15. See text accompanying notes 30-33 infra.
16. FED. R. Civ. P. 65(a)(1).
17. The showing required in courts of equity varies according to the factual
situations of the case, but generally such factors as danger of irreparable harm, hard-
ship to either party, and plaintiff's likelihood of success on the merits are considered.
18. The temporary restraining order (TRO), provided in rule 65(b), even though
it may be implemented quickly, does not solve the plaintiff's need for adequate pre-
trial protection from infringement.
Typically, a party seeking injunctive relief will first move for a TRO. Rule 65(b)
states that such an order may issue ex parte (similar to an impound order) upon a
showing of irreparable harm and certification by the moving attorney of: (1) the efforts
made to give notice and (2) the reasons why the TRO should issue without notice.
Following the issuance of a TRO without notice, rule 65 requires that the preliminary
injunction proceedings begin within 10 days, and the defendant may, during that
period, appear and move for dissolution of the TRO.
Thus, while it is technically possible for a business to be halted without notice or
a hearing under the TRO procedure, the stringent burdens placed upon the plaintiff
are much more protective of the defendant than the impound procedures which require
neither notice nor a hearing. More importantly, from a plaintiff's perspective, impound
permits the seizure of everything alleged to be infringing rather than merely calling to
a halt the infringing activities. Clearly, it is to the plaintiffs advantage to have the
allegedly infringing articles removed from the defendant's possession-an advantage
which is not part of the TRO-injunction procedure.
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of infringement," or a convincing showing of irreparable harm.
In Rushton v. Vitale,"0 for example, plaintiff discovered copies
of its doll selling in stores-copies so blatant that they even had
plaintiff's copyright registration and mold number on them.
Upon production of the doll in court, a preliminary injunction
was granted without a showing of irreparable harm, because
the dolls themselves constituted a prima facie case of infringe-
ment.
Conversely, in Inge v. Twentieth Century-Fox Film
Corp.,"' playwright William Inge had arranged a roadshow of
his play "Bus Stop." He had invested considerable sums of
money and engaged top talent for the show. Twentieth Century
Fox was going to release its film version of "Bus Stop" simulta-
neously, and Inge needed a preliminary injunction quickly. He
based his motion on the fact that incalculable irreparable in-jury would occur to his roadshow if it had to compete with
defendant's motion picture. The preliminary injunction was
granted on the basis of Inge's prospective losses, with little
inquiry into his ability to make a prima facie showing at the
hearing.
For each major theory of preliminary injunction there is a
widely-used exception carved out by the courts. Rather than
requiring a prima facie showing of infringement, as in Rushton,
most courts are satisfied with evidence indicating a likelihood
of success on the merits even though the defendant presents
evidence to rebut the prima facie showing."2 Similarly, where
the plaintiff has shown that irreparable harm will occur, a
defendant can offer evidence of harm to himself, causing the
court to apply the balance of hardships test.
The likelihood-of-success criterion was used in Mattel, Inc.
v. S. Rosenberg Co.23 In that case the defendant sold dolls made
in Hong Kong which Mattel contended infringed upon its copy-
righted "Kiddle" dolls and accessories. Since both parties
19. A prima facie case of infringement is made by presenting the following evi-
dence: a protected copy of the work with proper copyright notice thereon and an
infringing copy in violation of the exclusive rights of the copyright holder. Revision of
Copyright Law, Pub. L. No. 94-553, §§ 106-118, 501, 90 Stat. 2541 (1976).
20. 218 F.2d 434 (2d Cir. 1955).
21. 143 F. Supp. 294 (S.D.N.Y. 1956).
22. What showing will convince a court that the plaintiff is likely to succeed on
the merits is, like all showings used in granting preliminary injunctions, highly varia-
ble, but the procedure amounts to an abbreviated version of full scale courtroom
proceedings.
23. 296 F. Supp. 1024 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
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claimed irreparable harm and the defendant offered enough
evidence to counter Mattel's showing of copying, the court
granted a preliminary injunction based on its examination of
the two products, which, it observed, showed "overwhelming
evidence of identity resulting from imitation. 2 Although in
many instances this would have been a prima facie showing of
infringement, 25 the Mattel court, taking into account defen-
dant's showing, decided that a preliminary injunction should
issue because of plaintiff's strong likelihood of success."6
The balance of hardships test was applied in Columbia
Broadcasting System, Inc. v. American Society of Composers,
Authors, & Publishers.27 Here, two licensing societies 2 custom-
arily charged organizations, such as broadcasters, which use a
large number of licensed works, a flat annual rate based on spot
surveys of use, rather than charging for each actual use. CBS
had sued ASCAP and Broadcast Music, Inc. (BMI) to force
them to charge only for each actual use. In the meantime, CBS
withheld payment of license fees, and BMI sought a prelimi-
nary injunction to force CBS to pay for the continued use of
BMI's licensed works.
The federal district court in New York felt that the clearest
grounds for granting BMI's request rested upon the balance of
hardships test, since there were serious issues to be litigated
which were too complex to give any clues as to the likelihood
of success. Furthermore, since CBS ordinarily paid BMI ap-
proximately 1.6 million dollars annually, an amount which
constituted a substantial portion of BMI's revenue, and since
CBS was "a substantially larger and stronger organization than
BMI," the injunction was granted.2 9
There are also cases in which the court's reasons for grant-
24. Id. at 1026.
25. See note 19 supra.
26. The Mattel court engaged in a minute examination of the Mattel dolls and
defendant's dolls, and described its observations in great detail in the opinion. See 296
F. Supp. at 1026.
Despite the expenditure of time involved, the court was unable to determine that
an infringement had occurred. The problem posed by such procedures is that if all
courts were to deal at such length with preliminary injunction hearings, the burden
on court calendars would become unbearable. It is difficult to decide where to draw
the line between spending enough time to decide that an injunction can rightly issue
and actually going to the merits of the case at the hearing.
27. 167 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 754 (S.D.N.Y. 1970).
28. For insight into the operation of ASCAP and Broadcast Music, Inc., see CBS
v. ASCAP, 400 F. Supp. 737 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
29. 167 U.S.P.Q. at 757.
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ing or denying a preliminary injunction fit under neither the
likelihood of success nor the balance of hardships rubrics. In
those cases some courts have been highly imaginative in creat-
ing their own criteria for granting an injunction," or even sub-
stituting other remedies for the one sought.3 Still others, have
considered more than one factor in granting injunctive relief,32
and many have weighed the various determining factors differ-
ently. 33
Unless the plaintiff can make a Rushton-type prima facie
case, or clearly show irreparable harm, as in Inge, it becomes
very difficult to predict the result of a petition for a preliminary
injunction. This uncertainty of result, inherent in the prelimi-
nary injunction procedure, tends to make it less utilized if
other, more certain, mechanisms are available, such as the
statutory impound mechanism. Additionally, the balance be-
tween the need of the copyright holder for speedy action and
the need of the alleged infringer for just adjudication is clearly
struck in favor of the alleged infringer due to the existence of a
hearing on the merits that is required for a preliminary injunc-
tion. Finally, it is clearly advantageous to the copyright holder
to be able to deprive the infringer of the allegedly infringing
articles. This remedy is not available in the injunction proce-
dure-which makes the statutory impound procedure even
more appealing.
Impound-The Codification of an Equitable Remedy
Section 503(a) of the Revised Copyright Act grants courts
the power to impound "all copies or phonorecords claimed to
30. See Neal v. Glickman, 391 F. Supp. 1088 (N.D.Tex. 1975)(irreparable injury
not necessary); McGraw Hill, Inc. v. Worth Publishers, Inc., 335 F. Supp. 415(S.D.N.Y. 1971) (inability of defendant to respond in damages constitutes danger of
irreparable harm).
31. See Yale Univ. Press v. Row, Peterson & Co., 40 F.2d 290 (S.D.N.Y. 1930)(court required defendant to post a bond and account for its sales of the disputed work,
rather than enjoin sales, pending trial on the merits).
32. See Roy Export Co. v. Trustees of Columbia Univ., 344 F. Supp. 1350(S.D.N.Y. 1972)(limited showing of probable success plus substantial issues of fact
plus balancing of hardships considered); American Fabrics Co. v. Lace Art, Inc., 291
F. Supp. 589 (S.D.N.Y. 1968) (irreparable injury plus absence of adequate remedy at
law plus probability of success considered).
33. See Kontes Glass Co. v. Lab Glass, Inc., 373 F.2d 319 (3rd Cir. 1967)(decisive
weight given to likelihood of success where only slight possibility of irreparable injury);
H.W. Wilson Co. v. National Library Serv. Co., 402 F. Supp. 456 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) (only
marginal showing of probable success made, but strong danger of irreparable harm led
to granting of preliminary injunction).
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have been made or used in violation of the copyright owner's
exclusive rights, and of all plates, molds, matrices, masters,
tapes, film negatives, or other articles by means of which such
copies or phonorecords may be reproduced."34 The impound
remedy can be implemented "at any time while an action
under this title is pending . . . ."I Thus, immediately upon
filing an action, one who feels he is the victim of infringement
can ask to have both the allegedly infringing copies and the
means of producing them impounded."6
At first glance, there appears to be little significant differ-
ence between section 503(a) and the current impound provi-
sion. The current provision, section 101(c), states simply that
the defendant in an infringement suit may be required "[t]o
deliver up on oath, to be impounded during the pendency of the
action, upon such terms and conditions as the court may pre-
scribe, all articles alleged to infringe a copyright."37 However,
there are two major changes. First, unlike section 101(c), sec-
tion 503(a) of the revised Act makes it clear that both the
copies and the means of producing them are subject to pretrial
impoundment."8 Second, an important part of the former law,
the need for a preliminary showing of infringement, has been
eliminated.
The first phrase of section 101 reads: "If any person shall
infringe the copyright . . . such person shall be liable."" Pre-
sumably, this phrase requires a court to determine that in-
fringement had occurred before it could order impound-even
though the court was empowered to order the impound before
trial. With this requirement then, impound under section 101
prior to a trial on the merits was of questionable validity.
Against this backdrop, section 101 presented a quandary:
how far should the court delve into the merits of the plaintiff's
claim of infringement? Alternatively, was it fair to go into the
merits of the plaintiff's claim at all in an ex parte hearing?
34. See Revision of Copyright Law, Pub. L. No. 94-553, § 503(a), 90 Stat. 2541
(1976).
35. Id.
36. Since the Supreme Court Rules allow approval of the affidavit by a judicial
officer, the filing of the action and the issuance of the impound order can be simultane-
ous. The only remaining hurdle is to have the sheriff execute the order. See note 51
and accompanying text infra.
37. 17 U.S.C. § 101(c) (1970).
38. See text accompanying note 34 supra.
39. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1970).
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To alleviate this problem, the drafters of the revised Act,40
rather than providing for an adversary hearing prior to im-
poundment, similar to a preliminary injunction, simply
dropped the "shall infringe" language of section 101.11 Under
the new impound procedures a court no longer needs assurance
that an infringement has occurred before it grants an impound
order.2 Despite the impact of this change, the decision to drop
the requirement that infringement had occurred aroused little
controversy in any of the revision studies. 3
The preliminary study prior to the drafting of the revised
Act did arouse some controversy, however. The 1961 Report of
the Register of Copyrights proposed leaving as much discre-
tion44 as possible in the court's decision to grant impound. The
Register pointed out that impound was an extraordinary rem-
edy and presented "matters for the court to consider in exercis-
ing its discretion.""4 As a result, the report recommended that
"[t]he present provisions for the impounding and destruction
of infringing articles should be retained in substance."46
After the issuance of the 1961 report, the Register sought
comment on it from interested members of the copyright law
40. There were three major drafts published after the issuance of the 1961 Regis-
ter's Report: a preliminary draft, and revisions in 1964 and 1965. A table comparing
the three bills and § 101 is reproduced in COPYRIGHT LAW REVISION, PART SIX: SUPPLE-
MENTARY REPORT OF THE REGISTER OF COPYRIGHTS ON THE GENERAL REVISION OF THE U.S.
COPYRIGHT LAW: 1965 REVISION BILL app. B (1965) [hereinafter cited as 1965 REPORT].
41. Section 503 of the revised Copyright Act now begins by stating that the
impound remedy is available at any time during the pendency of the action. See
Revision of Copyright Law, Pub. L. No. 94-553, § 503 (a), 90 Stat. 2541 (1976).
42. This is to be inferred from the statutory language, which contains no mention
of actual infringement, but only "claimed" infringement. Id.
43. Of those who made their views known to the Register of Copyrights, only the
Motion Picture Association (see note 48 infra) had anything negative to say about the
proposed revisions to the impound provision. Their comments did not bring up the
"shall infringe" language. See COPYRIGHT LAW REVISION, PART Two: DiscussION AND
COMMENTS ON THE REPORT OF THE REGISTER OF COPYRIGHTS ON THE GENERAL REVISION OF
THE U.S. COPYRIGHT LAw 366 (1963) [hereinafter cited as 1963 REPORT].
44. The Supreme Court has indicated that the proper exercise of discretion is
essential to the operation of any ex parte procedure within constitutional limits:
Yet it has never been held that the hand of government as prosecutor
must be stayed until the courts have an opportunity to determine
whether the government is justified in instituting suit in the courts. Dis-
cretion of any official may be abused. Yet it is not a requirement of due
process that there be judicial inquiry before discretion can be exercised.
Ewing v. Mytinger & Casselberry, 339 U.S. 594, 599 (1950). Thus, the Court might view
unfavorably a limit upon a court's discretion in the administration of the impound
procedure.
45. See 1961 REPORT, supra note 4, at 108.
46. Id. at 109.
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community. 7 The only party who responded with criticism to
the Register's recommendations was the Motion Picture Asso-
ciation of America. 8 The members of the association, legiti-
mate distributors of films, are frequently plaintiffs in infringe-
ment suits, and understandably viewed the Register's approval
of broad discretion in the impound procedure with some alarm.
The association expressed its interest in replacing the discre-
tionary aspects of the procedure with a requirement that im-
pound be granted upon the demand of the copyright holder. It
commented: "we regret the suggestion in the Report that the
lower courts have a 'discretion' to deny the relief of impound-
ment altogether, even when a bond and affidavit complying
with the rules have been filed."49
By dropping the "shall infringe" language, Congress has
arguably eased some of the association's concern. The new
impound procedure clearly has broadened a court's power in a
direction favorable to the needs of plaintiffs. A court is no
longer required by statute to ascertain that an infringement
has occurred before it grants impound. The wording of the
statute gives the court the power to order impound immedi-
ately upon the filing of the action.
The Supreme Court Rules-Implementation of the Impound
Remedy.
Since 1909, the impound remedy has been implemented
through the rules promulgated by the Supreme Court, pur-
suant to congressional mandate in section 25 of the 1909 Act.'"
Intended to provide for the consistent application of the im-
pound remedy, the Rules' essential provisions are that an affi-
davit and bond must be delivered to the court before an im-
pound order will be granted, and that the defendant is entitled
to an adversary hearing after the seizure.5
47. Id. at iii.
48. The Motion Picture Association of America is an organization of film distrib-
utors. Its response to the 1961 report is reproduced in 1963 REPORT, supra note 43, at
341-69.
49. Id. at 366.
50. Act of March 4, 1909, ch. 320, § 25, 35 Stat. 1081-82. Section 25 was codi-
fied in 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1970) by the Act of July 30, 1947, Pub. L. No. 281, § 101, 61
Stat. 652. The pertinent rules are reproduced at app. A infra.
51. Rule 3 requires the affidavit to state the number, location, and value of the
items to be seized. Rule 4 sets the amount of the plaintiff's bond at twice the value of
the seized items. Rule 9 provides for the post-seizure hearing, although it sets no limits
upon the length of the period between seizure and hearing. See app. A infra.
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During the revision hearings, the suggestion was made
that the Supreme Court Rules be incorporated into the new
Copyright Act.2 Incorporation would have required courts to
follow the Rules and would have eliminated their discretion as
to what procedures to follow. The result of this requirement
would have been that impound would be automatic after one
filed the affidavit and posted bond. The Register, responding
to this suggestion in its 1965 report, restated its opinion that
application of the impound remedy should be discretionary,
and that use of the Rules should not be mandatory. While
conceding that "[i]t may well be that the problems of seizure
and impounding in copyright cases are so special that separate,
detailed rules . . .are justified . . .the present statute con-
tains no specific provision referring to the Supreme Court
Rules, and we see no need to include one in this bill.""5
At this point it should be observed that the Supreme Court
promulgated its Rules in the context of the 1909 Copyright Act,
which contained the "shall infringe" language." It could be
argued that the Supreme Court did not intend to allow im-
pound as an absolute right to anyone who complied with the
Rules, since the existing "shall infringe" language presented at
least a threshold obstacle. That language seems to require that
the trial court be satisfied that an infringement has occurred
before it grants impound. Thus, more than mere compliance
with the Rules would be necessary for impound; the plaintiff
would have to make a showing of infringement as well.
No opinion was issued with the Rules; hence it cannot be
ascertained what significance the Court gave to the "shall in-
fringe" language. Undoubtedly the Court was aware of its ex-
istence." Assuming arguendo that the Court intended its Rules
to be applied only after the threshold infringement showing, it
is clear that the Rules need review. If the 1909 Court intended
to afford the protection of the "shall infringe" language to de-
fendants against whom the impound remedy is asserted, and
the Congress has legislatively altered the remedy by removing
the "shall infringe" language, the protection the Court thought
appropriate has been abrogated.
52. See 1965 REPORT, supra note 40, at 133.
53. Id. at 133-34.
54. See 214 U.S. 533 (1909); 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1970).
55. The Court reproduced § 25 in full in footnote 2 in the Rules. See 214 U.S.
533 (1909).
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Although the level of protection for defendants at the filing
of the action appears to have been lowered, other protective
provisions of the Rules-those designed to assist the defendant
in recovering against an unsuccessful plaintiff-are unaffected
by the omission of the "shall infringe" language. 6 However, the
remedies available-monetary damages and return of items
seized" 7-are the same as those available under the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure in all civil actions. 5 Yet there is no
provision for pre-trial, ex parte seizure in the Federal Rules.59
Hence, copyright defendants are at a distinct disadvantage
compared with defendants in other types of civil actions in
federal courts.'"
Throughout the history of the 1909 Copyright Act, there
have been proposals to revise it.' During the 72nd Congress,
1931-32 term, two revision bills were introduced in the Senate
which dealt with the remedies available to copyright defen-
dants who had been subjected to seizures under the Act and
were subsequently found innocent. The Hebert Bill" and the
Dill Bill" both proposed a mandatory award of damages, rather
56. This is not to say that a defendant against whom impound has been wrong-
fully asserted can ever be properly compensated for his loss. Impound results in the
work being removed from the public view, yet most copyrightable works have no
monetary value except as offerings to the public. The consequences of delaying the
debut of a motion picture or the pre-publicized sale of a controversial book, in addition
to the financial loss, can include damage to the reputation of the producer or writer,
loss of public interest, obsolescence, etc. See, e.g., Estate of Hemingway v. Random
House, Inc., 49 Misc. 2d 726, 268 N.Y.S. 531 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1966)(attempted delay of
publication of Papa Hemingway).
57. Rule 4 empowers the court to exact a penalty from the plaintiff in addition
to requiring the return of items seized, should he be unsuccessful. See app. A infra.
58. See FED. R. Civ. P. 65(c).
59. FED. R. Civ. P. 64 allows seizure of persons or property according to the
procedures of the state in which the action is tried, unless there is a federal statute
which governs. All copyright cases are brought under the Copyright Law; thus its
provision for seizure is used, state procedures notwithstanding.
60. However, where state attachment laws are applied under FED. R. Civ. P. 64,
the defendant's fortunes vary widely. Many state attachment laws have recently been
challenged on constitutional grounds, and some have reached the Supreme Court. See,
e.g., North Georgia Finishing Co. v. Di-Chem, Inc., 419 U.S. 601 (1975); Randone v.
Appellate Dep't of the Super. Ct., 5 Cal. 3d 536, 488 P.2d 13, 96 Cal. Rptr. 709, cert.
denied, 407 U.S. 924 (1971).
California has a new attachment law, CAL. Civ. PROC. CODE §§ 482.010-492.090,
which is considered quite progressive in the degree of protection it affords defendants.
See, e.g., Note, California's New Attachment Law: Problems in Interpretation, 23
U.C.L.A. L. REv. 792 (1976).
61. See note 4 supra.
62. S. 176, 72d Cong., 1st sess. (1931).
63. S. 3985, 72d Cong., 1st sess. (1932).
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than the discretionary one then and now available under Su-
preme Court Rule 4.14
Another product of the revision effort was the appraisal of
Rules three through thirteen by the Advisory Committee on
Rules to the Supreme Court, issued in 1966.5 Their report cen-
ters on one main objection: the Rules' lack of protection to
defendants. Pointing out that the Rules contravene the general
policy of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which is to avoid
remedies anticipating decision on the merits,6" the Committee
concluded that because the Rules require neither notice nor a
showing of irreparable injury they should be revised. 7 At the
same time the Committee observed that a general revision of
the Copyright Law was in progress, and hence refrained from
suggesting specific changes in the Rules, on the assumption
that the Copyright Act revisers would incorporate additional
protections in the new law. 8
Despite the Committee's urging that the Rules be altered
to afford more protection for defendants, the Rules remain un-
touched." The net result is that the revised Copyright Law
saddles us with Supreme Court Rules three through thirteen as
written in 1909,70 minus whatever protection the "shall in-
fringe" language once afforded, when interpreted in light of the
Rules.
The Supreme Court Rules in Practice-Impound Cases
From the outset, courts had difficulty in dealing with sec-
tion 101(c), the impound provision of Title 17 of the United
States Code, because it allows impound pendente lite of "all
articles alleged to infringe the copyright."'" This language has
been given two interpretations. The first, and strictest, con-
struction of the language is that only copies are subject to
64. For the text of Rule 4, see app. A infra. These two bills never became law.
Even if they had, they would have been little more than surface remedies. They
proposed to cure the impound procedure by providing a damage remedy after the fact,
rather than focusing on the real ill-the ease with which an impound order could be
obtained.
65. Notes of Advisory Committee on Rules, 17 U.S.C.A. 176 (West Supp. 1976).
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. In leaving the Rules untouched the Copyright Act revisers heeded the recom-
mendation of the Register of Copyrights. See 1961 REPORT, supra note 4, at 109.
70. 214 U.S. 533, 536-39 (1909).
71. 17 U.S.C. § 101(c) (1970).
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seizure because only copies can infringe.72 The second interpre-
tation expands the language to make anything the plaintiff
alleges is infringing subject to seizure, including articles used
for making the copies.73 Despite this ambiguity in the statute,
the Supreme Court apparently did not recognize the distinc-
tion when it wrote the Rules, since Rule 3 clearly allows seizure
of both copies and the means for making them.74
In spite of the fact that Rule 3 allows for the seizure of the
copies and the means for making them, a major question re-
mains unanswered: can a court order the impound of articles
which can be used for making infringing copies but which are
also capable of other lawful uses?75 While courts have generally
agreed that both copies and means can be impounded," there
is confusion and inconsistency in the courts' handling of the
problem of neutral items.
The leading case on the lawful scope of a seizure is Duchess
Music Corp. v. Stern,77 which permitted the pretrial seizure of
neutral items based on the language of section 101(c). Duchess
owned the copyright on the compositions of many well known
composers and lyricists7" and alleged infringement of these
compositions by Stern. On the strength of its charge, Duchess
obtained a seizure order in a district court in Arizona for all
copies and the devices for making them.7"
The marshal executed the warrant and proceeded to dis-
mantle Stern's cassette tape business, depositing its entire in-
ventory of finished tapes, blank tape, packaging, and tape re-
corders in a warehouse. In accordance with Rule 9,80 Stern ap-
plied to the district court for return of all articles which were
72. See, e.g., Elektra Records Co. v. Gem Elec. Distrib., Inc., 360 F. Supp. 821
(E.D.N.Y. 1973). Here the court held that defendant's tape duplicating machines were
not subject to impound. At the same time, however, the court granted a preliminary
injunction prohibiting infringing use of the machines. Id. at 825.
73. See, e.g., Duchess Music Corp. v. Stern, 458 F.2d 1305 (9th Cir.), cert.
denied, 409 U.S. 847 (1972).
74. For the text of Rule 3, see app. A infra.
75. Such articles include tape recorders, presses, cameras, photocopiers, and the
like.
76. But see Elektra Records Co. v. Gem Elec. Distrib., Inc., 360 F. Supp. 821
(E.D.N.Y. 1973). See generally M. NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 158 (1976)
[hereinafter cited as NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT].
77. 458 F.2d 1305 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 847 (1972).
78. Included among Duchess' copyrights were works of Elvis Presley, Johnny
Cash, Burt Bacharach, Mick Jagger, Joni Mitchell, and Buck Owens. Id. at 1306-07.
79. Duchess Music Corp. v. Stern, 331 F. Supp. 127, 128 (D. Ariz. 1971).
80. For the text of Rule 9 see app. A infra.
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not copies. Stern's application was granted."' At that time he
had been out of business for about two weeks. Duchess ap-
pealed to the Ninth Circuit (a procedure not specified in the
Rules) and. Stern's tapes and equipment remained in the ware-
house.2
In reversing the district court, the court of appeals took the
view that the language of section 101(c) stating "all articles
alleged to infringe" means that anything the plaintiff alleges
is infringing is to be seized." Thus Stern's blank tape and
machines, which were certainly capable of noninfringing uses,
remained in the warehouse until there was a decision on the
merits, effectively preventing Stern from carrying on his tape
business which, it should be noted, had not yet been declared
unlawful. 4
Of particular interest here is the Arizona District Court's
lucid analysis of the language of Rule 3 in deciding that im-
pound of neutral items was improper:
Application of the rule of ejusdem generis requires that the
phrase 'or other means of making such infringing copies'
be held to apply only to the same class as are those items
specifically enumerated in the phrase immediately preced-
ing, and each of the preceding items-plates, molds, ma-
trices-is of such a particular character as to embody...
an identifiable impression of the copyrighted work. 5
Under this interpretation, such things as presses and tape re-
corders, which do not contain impressions of a work except
when in use, are not subject to seizure.
The court of appeals reversed the district court because
the district court was following Supreme Court Rule 3 while the
court of appeals was following section 101(c). Arguably, each
court correctly interpreted the law it used. The problem which
is presented is a direct conflict between two laws on the same
subject. However, since the terms and conditions of the im-
pound are subject to the granting court's discretion,"e the court
of appeals stood on firmer legal ground by upholding the trial
81. 331 F. Supp. at 128.
82. See 458 F.2d at 1307.
83. Id. at 1309.
84. Stern was ultimately found guilty of infringement. Id. at 1310-11.
85. 331 F. Supp. at 133.
86. Under 17 U.S.C. § 101(c) (1970), and under the revised law, impound is
ordered "on such terms and conditions as the court may prescribe." See Revision of
Copyright Law, Pub. L. No. 94-553, § 503, 90 Stat. 2541 (1976).
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court's impound order. 7
Section 503 of the Revision Act 8 appears to eliminate some
of the confusion. The "such terms" language remains, which
makes use of the Rules discretionary." But section 503 now
calls for seizure of all articles by means of which the allegedly
infringing copies can be made, rather than seizure of all alleg-
edly infringing articles.
Unfortunately, this is only a partial clarification, since the
question of whether or not neutral articles can be seized re-
mains unanswered by the new law. What to do with these
neutral articles is still subject to the conflicting interpretations
outlined by the courts in Duchess."° It remains to be seen what
judicial resolution will be given to the new provision. Presuma-
bly some courts will take a narrow view, limiting seizure orders
to only those items embodying an impression of the infringing
work; others will take a broad view, permitting the seizure of
all items from which potential copies can be made. Whatever
the result, plaintiffs and defendants will be as unsure of their
pre-trial status as they have been since 1909.
Pretrial Relief-Summary
In summary then, two basic pretrial procedures are avail-
able to a copyright holder seeking relief from infringe-
ment-preliminary injunction and impound. Both forms of re-
lief, however, present practical difficulties of application.
The preliminary injunction is highly protective of the in-
terests of the defendant in that no action can be taken against
him without notice and an adversary hearing.9 At this hearing
the court applies a balancing process to the facts presented
and, absent a prima facie showing of infringement, will con-
sider such equitable factors as the likelihood of success and the
87. There are no reported cases in which the procedures outlined in the Supreme
Court Rules were disregarded. However, the terms of the impound are discretionary,
according to § 101(c). Therefore, the court may specify what is to be seized. If a court
wants to support its view that everything should be seized, § 101(c) is applicable. If,
on the other hand, the court wants to limit the impound to infringing articles, the
language of Rule 3 permitting impound only of the means for making infringing copies
supports such a limitation.
88. See Revision of Copyright Law, Pub. L. No. 94-553, § 503, 90 Stat. 2541
(1976).
89. See note 86 and accompanying text supra.
90. Compare Duchess Music Corp. v. Stern, 458 F.2d 1305 (9th Cir.), cert.
denied, 409 U.S. 947 (1972), with Duchess Music Corp. v. Stern, 331 F. Supp. 127 (D.
Ariz. 1971).
91. FED. R. Civ. P. 65(a). See notes 12 & 18 supra.
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balance of hardships." The more facts a court examines at the
hearing the less likely it is to award or deny relief improperly.
As more facts are examined, however, the time involved in
granting relief increases. Thus, any progress made toward pro-
tecting the needs of the defendant by providing a full hearing
comes at the expense of the plaintiff's need for immediate relief
to safeguard his copyright. 3 Lacking concrete guidelines on
how extensive a pretrial hearing should be before granting
relief, courts have tended to favor one party's interests or the
others, alternatively rubber stamping a plaintiff's contentions
or engaging in a prolonged investigation of the merits.94
The impound procedure, too, presents practical difficul-
ties. The wording of section 503 of the Revision Act and the
Supreme Court Rules appears to allow seizure of both copies
and innocent articles. The effect is an overbroad seizure. It is
within the realm of possibility that an entire manufacturing
operation can be dismantled and impounded pending disposi-
tion of the suit. Some courts have later ordered the return of
innocent articles, indicating that their seizure was improper. If
any conclusion can be drawn, it is that the scope of permissible
seizure is uncertain.
An additional practical problem is posed by the elimina-
tion of the "shall infringe" wording in section 503 of the Revi-
sion Act. Those words arguably were intended to make it more
difficult to obtain impound by requiring an infringement show-
ing. As the Revision Act now reads, anyone who complies with
the Supreme Court Rules is entitled to impound; only the
"terms and conditions" of the impound remain subject to court
discretion."
CONSTITUTIONAL PROBLEMS OF IMPOUND
Statutes providing mechanisms for pretrial seizures in the
areas of wage garnishment and obscenity regulation have been
successfully challenged by the assertion of constitutional rights
92. See text accompanying notes 22-29 supra.
93. It is important to note that the TRO procedure provided in Rule 65(b) suffers
from the same vices, from the plaintiffs perspective, as the preliminary injunction
procedure of Rule 65(a). See note 18 supra.
94. See, e.g., Meeropol v. Nizer, 361 F. Supp. 1063 (S.D.N.Y. 1973); Prestige
Fabrics, Inc. v. Universal Mfg. Corp., 304 F. Supp. 903 (S.D.N.Y. 1969).
95. See text accompanying note 41 supra.
96. At least one commentator has criticized courts engaging in such a
"ministerial function." See The Supreme Court, 1973 Term, 88 H~Av. L. REV. 43, 79-
80 (1973).
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under the first and fifth amendments. The statutes involved in
those cases had strikingly similar provisions to those found in
the impound portion of the Copyright Act. Therefore, to gain
some insight into the constitutionality of section 503's seizure
provisions, it becomes useful to examine the Supreme Court
holdings on the constitutionality of those statutes.
Free Speech
The first amendment clearly limits congressional ability to
regulate speech97 and since the Copyright Act is a legislative
enactment it must meet the amendment's requirements.9" The
Supreme Court has never ruled on the first amendment suffi-
ciency of the impound provision; it is therefore important to
examine it in light of the wording of the first amendment, the
holdings of the Supreme Court on seizures pursuant to similar
provisions in state obscenity statutes, and the holdings of the
lower courts in infringement cases."
Typically, state obscenity laws have enforcement provi-
sions similar to the impound provision in the Copyright Act,
so that upon the request of a prosecutor a court order issues
allowing the seizure of everything alleged to be obscene.' 0 It is
not unusual for the affidavits of the state to be vague, or for
97. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
98. It is beyond the scope of this comment to discuss the possibility that the
Copyright Law itself is unconstitutional under the first amendment. See generally
Nimmer, supra note 5.
99. Full discussion of the doctrines developed by the Supreme Court in dealing
with laws restricting speech is beyond the scope of this comment. For the limited
purpose of discussion of the impound provision it is adequate to state simply that
where the Court perceives a legislative limitation on speech (and the impound provi-
sion is such a limitation) it has followed one of two paths.
First, the speech in question could be found to be such that it is not protected by
the first amendment. Examples of unprotected speech include obscenity, treason, and
arguably infringement of copyrighted material. Where speech is unprotected, laws
limiting it are not unconstitutional on first amendment grounds.
The second path the Court has followed leads to a holding that the speech is
protected by the first amendment but the law limiting it is permissible because it
furthers a legitimate state interest. Such laws are usually aimed at controlling harmful
conduct of which speech is a necessary ingredient. An example is a law against inciting
to riot. The law is intended to prevent riots but it accomplishes this goal by limiting
speech. In these cases the Court will uphold the law if it does not restrict speech more
than is necessary to further the legislative interest.
See generally Bogen, The Supreme Court's Interpretation of the Guarantee of
Freedom of Speech, 35 MD. L. REV. 555 (1976).
100. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 311 (West 1970).
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the order to permit seizure of everything on the premises. The
result is that innocent articles are often seized along with ob-
scene materials. 0'
The leading case involving first amendment rights and the
seizure of allegedly obscene materials is Kingsley Books, Inc.
v. Brown. "I Here, a seizure order was issued ex parte, and while
the Supreme Court upheld the seizure, the dissenting opinion
by Justices Black and Douglas presented a convincing first
amendment argument which later became the majority view of
the Warren Court: 0 3
The provision for an injunction pendente lite gives the
state the paralyzing power of a censor. A decree can issue
ex parte without a hearing and without any ruling or find-
ing on the issue of obscenity. This provision is defended on
the ground that it is only a little encroachment, that a
hearing must be promptly made. But every publisher
knows what an awful effect a decree issued in secret can
have. We tread here on First Amendment grounds. And
nothing is more devastating to the rights that it guarantees
than the power to restrain publication before even a hear-
ing is held.0 4
It is possible to apply the reasoning of the dissent in Kingsley
to the infringement-impound situation. Under the Supreme
Court Rules a prompt post-impoundment hearing is called for;
thus there is only "a little encroachment."'0 5 Furthermore, a
section 503 seizure prevents publication, a restraint found
"devastating" to first amendment rights in the Kingsley dis-
sent. 00
In A Quantity of Books v. Kansas, 7 the majority adopted
the view of the Kingsley dissenters. In attacking an ex parte
seizure as an abridgement of freedom of the press, the Court
said: "We conclude that the procedures followed in issuing the
warrant for the seizure of the books, and authorizing their im-
pounding pending hearing, were constitutionally insufficient
because they did not adequately safeguard against the suppres-
101. See, e.g., Porno, Inc. v. Municipal Court, 33 Cal. App. 3d 125, 108 Cal. Rptr.
797 (1973)(seizure of films and projectors from a theatre).
102. 354 U.S. 436 (1957).
103. See note 107 and accompanying text infra.
104. Id. at 446 (Black & Douglas, J.J., dissenting).
105. For the text of Rule 7, see app. A infra.
106. 354 U.S. at 446.
107. 378 U.S. 205 (1964).
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sion of non-obscene books."'' 0
Again, it can be argued that an analogous situation occurs
in section 503 seizures. Under section 503, articles are capable
of being seized before it is known whether or not they are in-
fringing. Similarly, the section provides no adequate safeguard
against the seizure of noninfringing articles.
Jondora Music Publishing Co. v. Melody Recording, Inc.05
raised the constitutional problems of impound under the Copy-
right Act. Melody was in the business of making duplications
of phonograph records."' Jondora, which owned the copyright
on some musical compositions appearing on Melody's taped
duplications, obtained a seizure order and impounded Mel-
ody's copies and equipment, closing down Melody Recording,
Inc. pendente lite.
Melody sought reversal of the writ of seizure in the New
Jersey Federal District Court and alleged that the impound,
which was found to have been in compliance with the Supreme
Court Rules, was unconstitutional under the first and fifth
amendments."'
The court minced no words in disposing of Melody's first
amendment claim, dealing with the issue in one sentence:
"Since the defendants concede they copy the creative works of
others I perceive no first amendment issue.""' 2 The court rea-
soned that infringement, like treason, was not protected by the
first amendment. "1
Since Melody conceded after the seizure that it had been
infringing the copyright, the court did not deal directly with
the propriety of the pretrial seizure itself. Thus, even though
in this particular case it turned out that once the facts were
revealed the impound was proper, the more general question of
the legality of seizures before the facts are determined was left
unanswered by Jondora.
108. Id. at 208.
109. 362 F. Supp. 494 (D.N.J. 1973), vacated on other grounds, 506 F.2d 392 (3d
Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 1012 (1975).
110. Such activity may infringe upon two copyrights: that of the owner of the
rights in the music itself, and that of the owner of the rights in the particular recording
embodying the musical composition. In court, the trier of fact must determine whether
the work in question was protected by copyright at the time it was duplicated by the
alleged infringer. See Revision of Copyright Law, Pub. L. No. 94-553, §§ 106, 114, 90
Stat. 2541 (1976); 17 U.S.C. § 1(a, f) (Supp. V 1975).
111. 362 F. Supp. at 496-99.
112. Id. at 499.
113. Id. The court relie4 on Nimmer, supra note 5, at 1192, 1203-04.
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The constitutional propriety of the impound procedure is
further confused by the uncertainty of the impact of the copy-
right clause of the Constitution. It can be argued that the
clause adds constitutional weight to the validity of the im-
pound procedure since the regulation of copyrighted material
is a specifically enumerated congressional power. This argu-
ment must fail, however, for the same reason that regulation
of nonobscene material must fail. While both obscene material
and infringing material are unprotected by the first amend-
ment, nonobscene and noninfringing material are protected
and only a hearing on the merits can determine the status of
the particular material in question.
Due Process
The fifth amendment provides a general proscription
against seizure of property without due process of law."' Since
impound involves the seizure of property, it is arguable that
due process demands must be met before impoundment may
take place." 5 The Supreme Court has required that special
safeguards be present before innocent articles can be seized.
Thus, a discussion of seizures of property under the Copyright
Act must take into account the Court's position on similar
seizures under other statutes.
The leading cases in which the meaning of due process has
been discussed in light of statutes allowing ex parte seizures are
the repossession and wage garnishment cases,"' beginning in
1969 with Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp."' Most states at
that time had statutes allowing ex parte"5 garnishment of
wages and repossession of goods sold on credit.
Like section 503, these statutes typically required only
that the person seeking the remedy apply to a magistrate and
post a bond. Although other grounds for finding these statutes
unconstitutional were asserted, the strongest arguments cen-
114. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
115. See Duchess Music Corp. v. Stem, 458 F.2d 1305 (9th Cir.), cert. denied,
409 U.S. 847 (1972). See also note 90 and accompanying text supra.
116. Full discussion of this line of cases is beyond the scope of this comment, but
it has been thoroughly treated elsewhere. See, e.g., 63 GEo. L.J. 1337 (1975); Note,
Constitutional Law-Prejudgment Garnishment, 1975 Wis. L. Rv. 860; The Su-
preme Court, 1973 Term, 88 HARV. L. REv. 43, 71-83 (1974).
117. 395 U.S. 337 (1969).
118. Compare, e.g., 1972 Cal. Stats., c. 550, §§ 4, 5 (pre-1976 attachment law)
with CAL. CiV. PROC. CODE §§ 487.010, 487.020 (West Supp. 1977) (property now sub-
ject to attachment).
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tered on the theme of a "taking of property."
Sniadach involved the Wisconsin wage garnishment law,
which provided that wages could be frozen upon an order by
the clerk of the court, mandating that the employer hold them
pending resolution of the dispute."9 The Supreme Court found
this procedure suspect since it deprived the laborer of his earn-
ings without any opportunity to be heard and tender a defense
on the merits.'2 °
The Court viewed the sole question as "whether there has
been a taking of property without . . .procedural due pro-
cess."' 2 ' The Court then pointed out that the basic elements of
due process in this setting were notice and a hearing before the
taking.'22 The Court found no provision for either in the Wis-
consin garnishment procedure and concluded it was constitu-
tionally deficient in these respects.'2 3
The leading case on repossession is Fuentes v. Shevin. ,24
Like Sniadach, it dealt with a state statute permitting the
seizure of property "simply upon the ex parte application of
any other person who claims a right to them and posts a secu-
rity bond.' 25 There was no provision for notice or a hearing
before seizure. 26
Using a line of reasoning nearly identical to that in
Sniadach, the Court found that minimum due process required
notice and an advance hearing, and that neither of these were
present in the statutes under consideration. The Fuentes Court
went further, however, and pointed out that statutory provi-
sions for a prompt post-taking hearing were insufficient. The
Court noted: "The fourteenth amendment draws no bright
lines around three-day, 10-day, or 50-day deprivations of prop-
erty. Any significant taking of property by the state is within
the purview of the Due Process Clause."'27
Two recent Supreme Court decisions have made analysis
of fifth amendment problems in pretrial seizures more compli-
cated. In Mitchell v. W.T. Grant Co., 2 the Court upheld a
119. 395 U.S. at 338 n.1.
120. Id. at 339.
121. Id.
122. Id. at 339-40.
123. Id. at 342.
124. 407 U.S. 67 (1972).
125. Id. at 69-70.
126. Id. at 70.
127. Id. at 86.
128. 416 U.S. 600 (1974).
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Louisiana statute permitting ex parte seizures of goods sold
under installment contracts.'29 The statute under consideration
was, like the Supreme Court Rules for impound, more protec-
tive of defendants than many similar statutes in that it allowed
recovery for damages for wrongful deprivations including
"injury to social standing or reputation as well as humiliation
and mortification."13 It also required the seizure order to be
issued by a judge, rather than a clerk. But it still clearly pro-
vided for ex parte seizure without notice.
The Mitchell Court distinguished Sniadach because it
dealt with wages, "a specialized type of property presenting
distinct problems in our economic system."'' It also distin-
guished Fuentes, even though it dealt with repossession, be-
cause the unconstitutional statute in Fuentes was, in several
details, less protective than the Louisiana statute.'
The Mitchell Court seemed to draw a line between ex parte
takings of property which are reasonable, and those which are
not. 13  Mitchell clearly indicates that in the Court's opinion it
is possible in limited circumstances to seize property without
prior notice and a hearing and yet still satisfy the fifth amend-
ment due process requirement. 3'
The Court subsequently indicated its continued willing-
ness to declare ex parte seizures of wages unconstitutional on
due process grounds, despite Mitchell. In North Georgia Fin-
ishing Co. v. Di-Chem, Inc.,'35 a corporate bank account of
$51,000 was seized under a Georgia law permitting issuance of
a seizure order by a court clerk, based upon the affidavit of the
claimant's attorney. 3 The Court distinguished its contrary
holding in Mitchell on the ground that the Georgia statute
involved in Di-Chem did not have the protective features of the
Louisiana statute in Mitchell. The differences were, first, that
a judge issued orders in Louisiana whereas a clerk issues them
in Georgia and, second, that a defendant was protected by a
bond and was entitled to damages for wrongful seizures in
129. The Court set forth the relevant statutes in an appendix to its opinion. See
id. at 620-23.
130. Id. at 606 n.8.
131. Id. at 614, quoting Sniadach v. Family Fin. Corp., 395 U.S. 337, 340 (1969).
132. Id. at 615-18.
133. Id.. at 616-17.
134. Id. at 618-19.
135. 419 U.S. 601 (1975).
136. Id. at 602 n.1.
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Louisiana while there were no such provisions in the Georgia
law. 137
As noted previously, in Jondora Music Publishing Co. v.
Melody Recording, Inc., 3 the defendant charged that the pre-
trial seizure in the infringement setting was an unconstitu-
tional taking of property without due process of law. 3 The
district court rejected this claim, asserting that Fuentes and
Sniadach did not apply: "It is fundamental that what 'process'
is due depends upon the circumstances of each case. Here pro-
visions exist to apply for relief from seizure. These are deemed
sufficient to comply with the constitutional mandate.""'4 Thus,
the district court apparently concluded, as the Supreme Court
had in Mitchell, that some ex parte seizures are reasonable.'
As the leading decisions highlight, the impound procedure
presents major constitutional problems which have yet to be
resolved. Within the ambit of the first amendment, impound
can be viewed as an impermissible encroachment on the free-
dom of the press by providing for the seizure of articles capable
of noninfringing uses.' Within the realm of the fifth amend-
ment, impound can be viewed as violative of the requirement
that innocent articles not be seized without notice and a hear-
ing.
RESOLVING THE CONFLICT
In ruling on the constitutional sufficiency of the impound
procedure the Court will have to weigh the competing interests
of the parties involved against the safeguards provided in the
Constitution.
137. Id. at 610.
The commentators have also supported the continuing validity of Sniadach as
requiring greater procedural safeguards in the garnishment setting. See, e.g., 63 GEO.
L.J. 1337, 1347 (1975); Note, Constitutional Law-Prejudgment Garnishment, 1975
Wis. L. REV. 860, 867.
This position seems particularly defensible when one considers that one whose
wages are garnished suffers a greater hardship than one whose chattels are repossessed.
138. 326 F. Supp. 494 (D.N.J. 1973), vacated on other grounds, 506 F.2d 392 (3d
Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 1012 (1975).
139. See text accompanying note 111 supra.
140. 362 F. Supp. at 499-500.
141. Despite the constitutional issue raised by the pre-trial seizure without no-
tice and a hearing, the Supreme Court denied certiorari. Melody Recording, Inc. v.
Jondora Music Publishing Co., 421 U.S. 1012 (1975).
142. There is also a fundamental conflict between the notions of copyright and
freedom of expression. See, e.g., Goldstein, Copyright and the First Amendment, 70
COLUM. L. REV. 983 (1970); Nimmer, supra note 5; Sobel, Copyright and the First
Amendment: A Gathering Storm?, 19 ASCAP COPYRIGHT L. SYMP. 43 (1971).
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In a copyright dispute, the interests of each side are
grounded in the Constitution. The plaintiff has an interest in
immediate pretrial relief from the defendant's infringing ac-
tivities, an interest which stems from the copyright clause of
the Constitution.'" Conversely, the defendant has an interest
in the protection of his freedom of expression as well as his
freedom from takings of property without due process of law;
also interests which stem from the Constitution."
To resolve the conflict between these competing interests
the Court will be called upon to determine whether the needs
of either party are strong enough to justify an intrusion upon
the constitutional rights of the other. The Court will then de-
termine how much intrusion upon the rights of the other is
permissible.'
The Competing Interests
Before a balancing test can be applied, an examination
and definition of the competing interests is necessary. Careful
scrutiny reveals that the interests in copyright infringement
cases differ substantially in some respects from the interests in
other types of seizures.
Plaintiff's interests. On plaintiff's side of the balance is,
first, the public interest in preserving the value of copyrights.'"
If the value of copyrights was to be lessened by limiting the
courts' ability to enforce them, part of the incentive for produc-
ing creative works would be taken away. Clearly there is a
public interest in providing an incentive for authors to produce.
Also on the plaintiff's side of the balance is the copyright
clause, which enables Congress to pass legislation giving au-
thors the exclusive rights in their writings.'47 Congress has
passed such legislation, embodied in Title 17 of the United
States Code, and it includes provisions for the enforcement of
the copyright holder's rights against infringers.'
143. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
144. U.S. CONST. amends. I & V.
145. See generally notes 151-163 and accompanying text infra.
146. The Supreme Court has held that there is a public interest in copyright in
addition to the interests of the copyright holder. See NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, supra note
76, at § 3.1.
147. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8. The enabling act in the Constitution says that
Congress has the power to "secure" exclusive rights to authors, a clear mandate for
putting teeth into a law safeguarding those rights.
148. 17 U.S.C. § 101(c) (1970).
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Defendant's interests. There are also two interests on de-
fendant's side of the balance. First, there is the public interest
in the free dissemination of ideas. Any procedure, such as im-
pound, which operates to suppress an idea before it is deter-
mined to be unprotected'49 invades this public interest.
The defendant is also interested in his rights under the
first and fifth amendments. Clearly, the rights to free expres-
sion and due process of law before the taking of property can
affect nearly everything a person does. For purposes of pretrial
seizures, however, the defendant's interest in these rights is his
interest in an impound procedure which is not unreasonable. 5 "
In the context of the first amendment, this involves a procedure
which is the most likely to result in the seizure of only infring-
ing articles and the least likely to restrict the freedom of ex-
pression. In the context of due process, this involves a proce-
dure which is the most likely to guarantee adequate notice and
a hearing before seizure and the least likely to omit either of
these safeguards.
Developing the Balancing Test
Though the Supreme Court has not applied a balancing
test to the impound provision, it has provided useful clues as
to what such a test would involve in other cases in which com-
peting interests were balanced to determine the reasonableness
of an ex parte procedure. Mitchell v. W.T. Grant Co. ' is espe-
cially instructive since it involved an ex parte procedure which
resembles the impound provision in several important re-
spects. 52
Initially it must be recognized that while the Louisiana
statute construed in Mitchell was similar to the impound pro-
vision, it was weighed against different interests than those
149. See note 113 and accompanying text supra.
150. Obviously, no procedure will be error-free. The Supreme Court has stated
that what is sought is the lowest possibility of error consistent with reasonable speed
and fairness to plaintiffs-in other words, a procedure which is not likely to result in
harm to the defendant:
If, on balance, the potential for harm to the defendant under the state-
adopted procedure is slight, in light of substantial advancement of a
legitimate state interest in providing ex parte preliminary relief, the pre-
judgment procedure will be upheld as a constitutional accommodation of
the conflicting interests.
Mitchell v. W.T. Grant Co., 416 U.S. 600, 607 (1974).
151. 416 U.S. 600 (1974).
152. See note 129 and accompanying text supra.
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which exist in an impoundment situation. To begin with, the
plaintiff's interest in Mitchell-an interest in the restoration of
goods sold on credit or payment on his contract, plus the public
interest in the continued availability of credit-does not have
the constitutional backing that the remedies for infringement
have. Further, there were no first amendment claims in
Mitchell; the question was only one of the reasonableness of the
seizure and the procedure leading to the issuance of the war-
rant. Arguably, therefore, the plaintiff's side of the balance in
the copyright-impound area has greater weight than it did in
Mitchell, because of the constitutional foundation of copyright.
The Mitchell Court held that the Louisiana seizure statute
gave rise to a reasonable procedure, and that seizures under it
were not violative of the defendant's rights. The Court was not
unmindful of the fact that in Sniadach and Fuentes seizure
statutes had been overturned. In light of this, the Mitchell
holding indicates that it is possible to have a "reasonable" pre-
trial seizure that comports with fifth amendment due process.
Three provisions in the Louisiana statute were critical to
its being upheld as constitutional. First, unlike other seizure
laws, but similar to section 101(c), the statute required presen-
tation of the request for seizure before a neutral magistrate.
Second, the statute required the party seeking seizure to post
a substantial bond pending the outcome of the trial. Finally,
an immediate post-seizure hearing was available at the defen-
dant's request at which damages could be awarded for wrongful
seizure.
The presence of these features led the Mitchell Court to
conclude that the seizure statute adequately safeguarded the
defendant's constitutional rights. Thus, the Court observed
that the plaintiff could assert his statutory rights without un-
reasonably threatening the defendant's interest. 5 '
Against this backdrop, it appears the Court is focusing on
whether or not a statute permitting ex parte seizure accom-
plishes its intended purpose without unduly encroaching on the
rights of either party. The Mitchell statute achieved this ac-
comodation by providing a pre-seizure hearing before a neutral
judge, requiring the party seeking seizure to post a bond, and
making available a prompt post-seizure hearing. In the wake
of Mitchell, it would seem that an ex parte seizure procedure
153. The Court said: "In our view, this statutory procedure effects a constitu-
tional accommodation of the conflicting interests of the parties." 416 U.S. at 607.
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embodying all three features would have substantial indicia of
reasonableness.
Applying the Test
The strengths of the competing interests in the impound
setting make the results of applying the balancing test far from
certain. There are several avenues open to the Court in resolv-
ing either the due process or first amendment claims. The ave-
nues selected by the Court must take into account the special
nature of infringements-the fact that damage to the copy-
righted work can occur instantaneously, thus calling for an
especially speedy remedy.
Resolving the first amendment claim. Initially, the Court
might conclude that the impound provision violates the first
amendment on the ground that it is overbroad and has the
capacity to punish protected speech when other less drastic
procedures such as an injunction would not.'54 This conclusion
would be bottomed on the belief that the impound procedure,
in permitting the seizure of articles without a determination
that they are in fact infringing, inhibits the exercise of the
constitutionally protected right to freely disseminate ideas.
Additionally, even if the Court does not find the impound
procedure overbroad on its face, it could conclude that the
procedure violates the first amendment by permitting the sei-
zure of articles capable of noninfringing uses.'
On the other hand, the Court might reasonably conclude
that infringement is not protected by the first amendment,
thus no first amendment claim can be relied on to attack the
impound procedure in a copyright case."'
Apart from this the Court could note that infringement is
a proper subject of government regulation due to the copyright
clause.'57 In light of this fact, the Court might conclude that
impound is a reasonable method of effectuating the govern-
ment purpose given the plaintiff's need for speedy relief in an
infringement case. Thus, the procedure does not improperly
inhibit the exercise of constitutionally protected rights.
Resolving the due process claim. The Court could settle
154. See generally Reyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589 (1967); Shelton
v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479 (1960).
155. See notes 97-113 and accompanying text supra.
156. See notes 112-113 and accompanying text supra.
157. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
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the issue of how much due process is required in an infringe-
ment case by reasoning that no due process is required in such
a case. The foundation of this conclusion is the copyright
clause, which would be held to provide an independent consti-
tutional guarantee which supercedes the need for due process,
and mandates the protection of the author's work by whatever
procedures are deemed necessary by the legislature.
If the Court holds that due process applies, the issue will
be how much process is due. In facing this question, the Court
might view the impound procedure as not adequately protec-
tive of the defendant and thus depriving him of his property
without due process in violation of the fifth amendment. In
support of this, the Court could begin by noting that impound
contains a high potential of harm to the defendant since it can
deprive him of his source of income. Thus, by analogy to the
wages protected in other cases,' the defendant is being de-
prived of property deserving of special protection. With these
considerations in mind the impound procedure could be ad-judged constitutionally deficient since it does not provide for
adequate notice and a hearing before seizing the property in
question.'
However, the Court could just as easily conclude the im-
pound procedure is reasonable and fully protective of the de-
fendant. The Court could begin by noting that the procedure
requires the plaintiff to post a substantial bond, payable to the
defendant should the court decide the plaintiff seized items in
violation of the defendant's rights.' This feature can be
viewed as protecting the defendant from spurious claims, as it
forces the plaintiff to incur a risk when he seeks impound.
Additionally, the Court might be persuaded that this is
not a situation where special protection is demanded, since
copyright defendants are generally well financed and do not
suffer greatly at the hands of this ex parte remedy. Similarly,
the Court could point out that the defendant's financial status
will permit him to seek legal redress from the filing of suits
based on less than solid contentions. 8 '
158. See, e.g., North Georgia Finishing Co. v. Di-Chem, Inc., 419 U.S. 601
(1975); Mitchell v. W.T. Grant Co., 416 U.S. 600 (1974); Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S.
67 (1972); Sniadach v. Family Fin. Corp., 395 U.S. 337 (1969).
159. See notes 119-127 and accompanying text supra.
160. See app. A infra.
161. Compare this setting with that in the typical wage garnishment case. In the
latter situation, the defendant is more likely to be seriously injured by being deprived
of his property; he is more likely to be unable to afford counsel to protect his interests.
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Finally, the Court could justify the existence of such an
extraordinary procedure based on the fact that there is an inde-
pendent constitutional mandate supporting it, and that proper
deference for carrying out the intent of the founding fathers
dictates that it deserves equal dignity. Thus, a possible en-
croachment on the defendant's due process rights is overcome
by the need to balance competing constitutional concerns.
As the hypothetical resolutions indicate, the outcome of
the balancing approach with respect to the impound procedure
is far from certain. However, several factors point in favor of
the constitutional adequacy of impound. First, the statute
provides for two of the procedures found critical to a finding
of reasonableness in Mitchell; presentation of the request for
seizure before a neutral magistrate and the posting of a sub-
stantial bond by the party requesting seizure pending the out-
come of the litigation.' Second, the Constitution itself sup-
ports the adequacy of the procedure, by permitting the legis-
lature to pass statutes deemed necessary to protect copy-
righted works.'
CONCLUSION
This comment has outlined the difficulties of application
which pervade the pretrial remedies available to plaintiffs in
copyright infringement actions. The impound provision has
two major practical problems-the uncertainty of the amount
of discretion the trial court has in granting impound, and the
vagueness of the the language which defines the scope of sei-
zure permissible under the statute. The preliminary injunction
procedure may be too cumbersome to be an effective tool in
halting infringing activities before trial. The nature of the
showing required by the court is unclear, and while evidence
is being presented to the court the infringement may continue,
further damaging the plaintiff. The injunction procedure re-
quires notice to the defendant, which is protective of his inter-
ests but may also prevent the court from acting quickly enough
to prevent irreparable harm to the plaintiff's copyright.
The constitutional conflicts inherent in the impound pro-
cedure have also been explored. Its first amendment problems
stem from the more fundamental clash between the notions of
copyright and freedom of expression. Its fifth amendment due
162. See 17 U.S.C. § 101(c) (1970); Revision of Copyright Law, Pub. L. No. 94-
553, § 503, 90 Stat. 2541 (1976).
163. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
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process problems raise questions of the propriety of all pretrial
seizures.
However, seizures under the impound provision may not
be subject to the same considerations as other seizures. This
view is bottomed on realization that statutes safeguarding
copyrighted works are mandated by the Constitution itself. In
view of this constitutional underpinning, it seems reasonable to
conclude that even in light of first amendment and due process
concerns the impound provision will be upheld.'
Raoul Anthony Renaud
164. This comment was awarded first prize at the University of Santa Clara
School of Law in the 1977 Nathan Burkan Memorial Competition sponsored by the
American Society of Composers, Authors and Publishers.
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Appendix A
Supreme Court Rules*
Rule 3
Upon the institution of any action, suit or proceeding, or at
any time thereafter, and before the entry of final judgment or
decree therein, the plaintiff or complainant, or his authorized
agent or attorney, may file with the Clerk of any Court given
jurisdiction under section 34 of the Act of March 4, 1909, an
affidavit stating upon the best of his knowledge, information
and belief, the number and location, as near as may be, of the
alleged infringing copies, records, plates, molds, matrices, etc.,
or other means for making the copies alleged to infringe the
copyright, and the value of the same, and with such affidavit
shall file with the Clerk a bond executed by at least two sureties
and approved by the Court or a Commissioner thereof.
Rule 4
Such bond shall bind the sureties in a specified sum, to be
fixed by the Court, but not less than twice the reasonable value
of such infringing copies, plates, records, molds, matrices, or
other means for making such infringing copies, and be condi-
tioned for the prompt prosecution of the action, suit or proceed-
ing; for the return of said articles to the defendant, if they or
any of them are adjudged not to be infringements, or if the
action abates, or is discontinued before they are returned to the
defendant; and for the payment to the defendant of any dam-
ages which the Court may award to him against the plaintiff
or complainant. Upon the filing of said affidavit and bond, and
the approval of said bond, the clerk shall issue a writ directed
to the Marshal of the district where the said infringing copies,
plates, records, molds, matrices, etc., or other means of making
such infringing copies shall be stated in said affidavit to be
located, and generally to any Marshal of the United States,
directing the said Marshal to forthwith seize and hold the same
subject to the order of the Court issuing said writ, or of the
Court of the district in which the seizure shall be made.
Rule 5
The Marshal shall thereupon seize said articles or any
* 214 U.S. 533 (1909).
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smaller or larger part thereof he may then or thereafter find,
using such force as may be reasonably necessary in the prem-
ises, and serve on the defendant a copy of the affidavit, writ,
and bond by delivering the same to him personally, if he can
be found within the district, or if he cannot be found, to his
agent, if any, or to the person from whose possession the arti-
cles are taken, or if the owner, agent, or such person cannot be
found within the district, by leaving said copy at the usual
place of abode of such owner or agent, with a person of suitable
age and discretion, or at the place where said articles are found,
and shall make immediate return of such seizure, or attempted
seizure, to the Court. He shall also attach to said articles a tag
or label stating the fact of such seizure and warning all persons
from in any manner interfering therewith.
Rule 7
Within three days after the articles are seized, and a copy
of the affidavit, writ and bond are served as hereinbefore pro-
vided, the defendant shall serve upon the clerk a notice that
he excepts to the amount of the penalty of the bond, or to the
sureties of the plaintiff or complainant, or both, otherwise he
shall be deemed to have waived all objection to the amount of
the penalty of the bond and the sufficiency of the sureties
thereon. If the Court sustain the exceptions it may order a new
bond to be executed by the plaintiff or complainant, or in de-
fault thereof within a time to be named by the Court, the
property to be returned to the defendant.
Rule 9
The defendant, if he does not except to the amount of the
penalty of the bond or the sufficiency of the sureties of the
plaintiff or complainant, may make application to the Court
for the return to him of the articles seized, upon filing an affida-
vit stating all material facts and circumstances tending to show
that the articles seized are not infringing copies, records,
plates, molds, matrices, or means for making the copies alleged
to infringe the copyright.
Rule 10
Thereupon the Court in its discretion, after such hearing as
it may direct, may order such return upon the filing by the
defendant of a bond executed by at least two sureties, binding
them in a specified sum to be fixed in the discretion of the
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Court, and conditioned for the delivery of said specified articles
to abide the order of the Court. The plaintiff or complainant
may require such sureties to justify within ten days of the filing
of such bond.
